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Abstract—Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), also known
as drones, provides unique functionalities, which allows area
surveillance, Inspection, surveying, unarmed cargo, armed at-
tack machines, and aerial photography. Although drones have
been around for sometimes, mass adoption of this technology is
new. The technology is widely adopted in fields including law
enforcement, cartography, agriculture, disaster monitoring, and
science research. Due to vulnerabilities, and the lack of stringent
security implementation, drones are susceptible to GPS spoofing
attacks, integrity attacks and de-authentication attacks. These
attacks which can allow criminals to access data, intercept
the drone and, and use it commit a crime and complicate
forensic investigation. The need for standardized drone forensics
is imperative in order to help identify vulnerabilities in different
models of drones, solve drone related crime, and enhance
security; thwarting any anti-forensic measure by criminals.
Thus, this paper is presented to report on potential attacks
against the Parrot Bebop 2 drone, and the ability for an
investigator to collect evidence about the attacks on the drone.
This paper aims at examining the possibility of establishing
ownership and collecting data to reconstruct events, linking
the drone controller with the drone to prove ownership, flight
origins and other potentially useful information necessary to
identify the proprietor of a crime. In addition, we have also
proposed a small-scale drone ontology for modeling drone
context data, and simple forensic processing framework for
small-scale drones.
Index Terms—digital forensics, investigation, drone security,
drone attack, context data, drone ontology
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, there has been rapid growth in
the interest of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) technology.
Due to the endless possible uses in civil life, the technology
that was once reserved for military use has evolved greatly
from a tool for completing dangerous operations such as
rescue missions. UAVs, commonly referred to as drones,
are aircrafts without any pilots that can be controlled either
remotely or autonomously based on a pre-programmed flight
path [1]. Currently drones are used in several key applica-
tions such as telecommunications relay, police surveillance,
border patrol, reconnaissance, inspection of remote power
lines and pipelines, traffic and accident surveillance, emer-
gency and disaster monitoring, cartography and mapping,
agricultural spraying, aerial photography, promotion and ad-
vertising, and fire-fighting [2]. There are also strong interests
in the use of drones for commercial transportation.
In 2017, the Roads and Transport Authority of the United
Arab Emirates, in collaboration with the Chinese EHANG
Company, announced that it had carried out the first test
run of a drone, branded as EHANG184, which is capable of
carrying a human, in skies of Dubai [19]. Other worldwide
companies, such as Amazon, have shown interest in harness-
ing the benefits of drones, and adopting this new technology
as an asset to aid with delivering packages. However, drone
benefits do not come without a cost. The pervasive use
of drones has spark both technical and societal concern
relating to cybersecurity, privacy, and public safety. Drones
can be used to collect information that can aid criminals
and terrorists in crimes ranging from theft of personal bank
details to loss of highly sensitive military recon footage [3].
In addition, they can be used as weapons when programmed
to crash into densely populated areas injuring and potentially
killing civilians. In 2011, a Massachusetts man was arrested
for plotting to fly a remote controlled drone packed with
C4 explosives into the Pentagon and the American capital
[4]. Also, in 2016, drones forced the airspace around Dubai
International Airport to close on three separate occasions -
one of which caused delays to 85 flights departing the United
Arab Emirates, thus incurring significant costs [20].
As evidenced by these recent events, which are criminal
in nature, there is a imminent need for a systematic forensic
approach, which would allow us to link a drone to its owner
during investigation of such crimes. The need for research
in drone forensics is pressing, however research in this area
is limited due to a number of challenges. These challenges
includes but not limited to: the increased availability of
different types of drones; the lack of standardization in drone
security; the differences in drone structures, components, and
storage media; and finally proper evidence acquisition tools
which allows investigator to maintain chain of custody and
integrity.
In this paper, we conducted an investigation on a drone
controller and the drone itself to determine the possibility of
acquiring flight data, extracting media taken by the drone,
establishing ownership, and documenting the results of the
attack against Parrot Bebop 2 and collecting other evidentiary
information. We also proposed a small-scale drone ontol-
ogy for modelling drone context data, and simple forensic
processing framework for small-scale drones. This paper is
structured as follows: the Related Work section discusses
various papers that have been published in this area of study,
followed by the Experimental Method section that discusses
the methodology used to perform the attacks against Parrot
Bebop 2. The results of Parrot Bebop 2 investigations are
presented in the Result and Discussion section, while a
summary of the paper is presented in the Conclusion section
II. RELATED WORK
A. Cyber Attacks Against the Drone
As any other technology, drones are vulnerable to different
types of attacks. In a paper Cyber Security Threat Analysis
and Modeling of an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems”,
published in 2012, the authors Javaid, Sun, Devabhaktuni,
and Alam analyzed various cybersecurity threats against
drones systems[5]. The authors deduced that attacks against
drone systems are divided into three main categories based
on cybersecurity threat models. First, confidentiality attacks
deal with unauthorized access to information by compromis-
ing the security of communication links between a UAV and
its controller [5]. Second, integrity attacks can be conducted
through modification of existing information or fabrication
of new information [5]. Lastly, availability attack involves
jamming, falsifying signals and Denial of Service attacks
are some example of cyber-attacks that can be considered a
major threat to UAV systems availability [5].
According to E. Vattapparamban, I. Guvenc, A. Yurekli,
K. Akkaya and S. Uluagac [6]in their paper ”Drones for
Smart Cities: Issues in Cybersecurity, Privacy, and Public
Safety, published in 2016, the common cyber-attacks against
drones in 2016 were were De-authentication attacks and GPS
spoofing attacks. De-authentication attack can be carried out
using an attackers’ machine and known IP address of the
drone and its controller. The attackers machine sends disas-
sociate packets to the drones controller in order to disconnect
it from the drone, which results in losing the connection. This
can give the attacker complete control over the drone. This
attack compromises the drones’ confidentiality, integrity, and
availability [6]. GPS spoofing attack on the other hand can
be carried out by transmitting fake GPS coordinates to the
control system of the drone, which results in hijacking it [6].
B. Drones as Cyber Attack Tool
The previously discussed attacks against drones can be
used by malicious entities to conduct physical and cyber-
attacks, targeting societies and individuals. According to
Kuchler[7], hackers could fly drones outside of corporate
buildings and intercept their communications by attacking
the corporations Wi-Fi signals, Bluetooth signals and other
wireless connections [7]. Such acts could result in collecting
sensitive data about the corporation [6]. It is essential to
note that many companies who have previously thought of
themselves as protected by using their landscapes, or housing
data centres in hard to access spaces are now vulnerable
to this new threat. In cases such as these, authorities must
have the ability to confiscate drones and conduct a forensic
analysis in order to identify and locate the owner of the drone
used in such a malicious act.
C. Need for Drone Forensics
The aforementioned reasons highlight the imminent need
for Drone forensics research to be conducted. This is critical
in order to help investigators identify and understand the
best methods for collecting and analyzing data related to
an attack launched by a drone or launched on a drone.
Drone forensics can help investigators reconstruct events
and identify potential suspects of a crime. There have been
several global incidents where crimes involving drones have
gone unresolved due to the fact that investigators have been
unable to reconstruct events or trace back to the proprietor
of the drone. For example, in 2015 St. Bernardino County
in California offered 75,000 dollars in exchange for help in
tracking down the owner of a drone who flew over wildfires
forcing firefighters to ground aircrafts carrying water to
quench the fire[22]. This consequently caused faster spread
of wild fire and incurred significant cost to the county.
Similar incidents have been reported by Dubai International
airport(UAE), Toronto Billy Bishop airport(Canada), and
other places across the globe. In all these cases, the pro-
prietors of these drone are still at large due to the inability
of forensic investigators to trace back drones involved in a
crime.
In 2015 a paper published by Horsman[8] presented results
of a digital forensic investigation that was conducted on a
Parrot Bebop 1 drone. The investigation was done on the
drone itself as well as on the controller. The result shows
the ability to acquire data stored in both the drone and its
controllers (Galaxy S3 and iPhone 6). In addition, they were
able to identify the full movement of both the drone and
the controllers during a flight session. Moreover, all storage
media content can be extracted along with information such
as the longitude and latitude coordinates, and the date of the
recording. However, it was not possible to establish owner-
ship of a drone found without its controller (i.e. if a user had
abandoned it at the scene of a crime) [8]. This research work
focused on only Parrot Bebop 1; however, more research
is needed for different types of drones commonly used, as
results may vary. This research presents an opportunity for
an in-depth look and need for more research into drone
and mobile device forensics; since it is common for mobile
devices to be used as controls for drones.
In Drone Forensics: Challenges and New Insights H.
Bouafif etl., conducted experiment on Parrot AR Drone
2.0[9]. The authors presented the possibilities of acquir-
ing forensic images using four different methods: wireless
connections via FTP and Telnet, and direct connections
using USB port and serial (UART) port connection. They
connected to the Wi-Fi hotspot and performed a port scan
using Nmap on the drones IP range. Once scanned, the
results showed that connections to a root shell using FTP
and Telnet could be established. Exploiting the vulnerability
in the drone system architecture, the authors were able to
access the operating system files since the root account was
not encrypted. Since the USB connection does not allow
direct access to the physical disk where the system files and
onboard data reside, a text-based serial console connection
using CP210 USB-to-TTL converter was used. In addition,
the authors were able to recover flight path data from the
mobile controller running the AR.FreeFlight application.
Furthermore, they were able to identify the controllers ID in
order to establish drone ownership by matching the drones
serial number with information found on the controller [9].
Although their work is a great contribution, it did not propose
a solution to other core forensics challenges including but not
limited to presenting a standard framework for evidence col-
lection, dealing with acquisition and confiscation of drones in
an active crime, and gathering information about the attacks
and the drone to aid other forensic investigators.
III. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
The investigation has been performed on the drone con-
troller (i.e. iPhone 6s) and the Parrot Bebop 2 drone to ac-
quire flight data, media recorded by the drone, and ownership
information using FTP and iTunes backup. The results show
that Parrot Bebop 2 is vulnerable to attacks and that it is
possible to link the drone controller with the drone to prove
ownership. Lastly, flight origins and other potentially useful
information can be found and used to correlate and recon-
struct events. For this experiment, Parrot Bebop 2, which
was released in November 2015, was used [10]. It includes
a dual-core processor with quad-core GPU processor with
8 Gbit RAM and supports Wi-Fi standards IEEE 802.11
a/b/g/n/ac. It can be controlled using various interfaces, such
as Android or iOS running freely available software such as
FreeFlightPro [11].
The Wi-Fi network of this drone uses a class C IP
address in this case 192.168.42.1. It has an open FTP server,
which includes images, videos and black box readings [12].
Therefore, it should be possible to perform different kinds
of attacks such as de-authentication attack in order to hijack
the communication between the drone and paired devices
and potentially gaining control of the drone. Furthermore,
the open FTP port provides an opportunity to modify media
and flight data files resulting in data integrity issues. The test
several scenarios looking for possibility of attacking Parrot
Bebop 2 and acquiring related evidential information. Here
it is possible to establish ownership, reconstruct events, and
collect evidentiary information related to an attack against
Parrot Bebop 2. Based on current research in the field, we
can make the following hypotheses:
• H1: Communication between the drone and paired
device can be intercepted in order to gain control of
the drone//
• H2: Internal storage of the drone can be accessed to
conduct data acquisition
• H3: Data inside the internal storage be manipulated
(putting into question its integrity during forensic in-
vestigation)
• H4: Ownership of the drone be established with infor-
mation found on drone’s media storage
• H5: Drone events be correlated and reconstructed
• H6: Artifacts from any previous attacks can be acquired
To conduct experiment to prove our set hypothesis based
on preliminary findings, we set up a DELL laptop running
Kali Linux. This setup was used in order to perform the
previously discussed attacks against Parrot Bebop 2. The
controller, in this case is a standard iPhone 6s (iOS version)
running FreeFlight Pro. Previous backup of controller data
was acquired through iTunes backup
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. De-authentication Attack
In order to conduct the attack, the running interfaces of
the attackers machine must be active in order to access the
interfaces of the drone in order to acquire both the MAC
address of the drone and connected controller. Proceeding
with this experiment, the Parrot Bebop 2 was turned on and
the Linux machine was connected to the drones wireless
Bebop-396004. The following setups were executed in order
for the attacker to gain controller of the drone:
• The command iwconfig was run to display the wireless
network interfaces [13].
• Next, the drones interface wlan was started using the
command airmon-ng start wlan0mon.
• Then, the command airodump-ng wlan0mon was run on
the same machine to list all the wireless networks in the
area, their MAC addresses and other useful information
about them.
• Once the drones BSSID was spotted, the process
was stopped. With the BSSID Mac address in
hand, the next step is run airodump-ng c 6 bssid
A0:14:3D:C1:F5:7B w /root/Desktop wlan0mon. In this
case A0:14:3D:C1:F5:7B represent the mac address of
the BSSID, and the c option in the previous command
specifies the channel of the target network. w and
/root/Desktop options specify the place where airo-
dump will save any intercepted 4-way handshake, and
the wlan0mon indicates the monitor-enabled interface,
which enables the capture of more specific information
about the Bebop network in order to hijack it.
• Then, when the MAC address of the controlling
station appeared, the command aireplay-ng -0 0 a
A0:14:3D:C1:F5:7B c 68:DB:CA:BC:EE:8F wlan0mon
was run in another terminal simultaneously. This com-
mand forces the Kali Linux machine to reconnect by
sending de-authentication packets to one of the net-
works devices(Fig.2), making it think that it has to
reconnect with the network. The command is structured
as follows: -0 option is a shortcut for the de-auth
mode, the 0 means the number of de-auth packets to be
sent, -a option indicates the access point/routers BSSID
followed by the BSSID of the target network- in this
case it was A0:14:3D:C1:F5:7B, -c option indicates the
clients BSSID 68:DB:CA:BC:EE:8F (i.e. the device to
be de-authenticated), and wlan0mon which indicates the
monitor interface as shown in Fig. 1[14].
Following these steps, it was possible to intercept the
signal between the Parrot Bebop 2 and its controller iPhone
Fig. 1. Sending de-auth packet to intercept the communication
6S. The main controller lost control of the drone and an error
message appeared on the display screen of the controller,
while the Parrot Bebop 2 fell and crashed. This proves the
first hypothesis that Parrott Bebop 2 communication can be
intercepted is true. This finding can be used for good and bad
endeavor. First, in the case of malicious use, the adversary
could have taken control of the drone and used it for other
purposes, such as; flying it to commit a crime. On the other
hand, during forensic investigation this method can used by
law enforcement officers to crash a drone with the intent
to to confiscate it for further analysis. Take for instance
in Kentucky USA, a man shot a drone with a shotgun
because it was flying above his house and he interpreted
such as a violation of his privacy. Such rash actions were
taken as the man believed that law enforcement was unable
to help [22]. Implementing the experimental findings into
practice could have allowed law enforcement officers to
peacefully resolve such cases. Further, a more interesting
novelty and a real world implementation of such will be
equipping commercial planes with the ability conduct a de-
authentication of a drone that finds itself within a commercial
flights flight path, threatening passenger safety. Near misses
of an intersection of a commercial planes flight path and
that of a drone have been reported to airports across the
globe. A clear example of such an incident was illustrated
in November 2016, when a major air disaster was narrowly
avoided over London skies[20]. A drone nearly collided with
an Airbus 320 carrying 165 passengers aboard [20]. Also
within the same year, two crew members of a Canadian-
based airline, Porter airways, were injured as the aircraft
had to suddenly shift in order to evade a drone [21]. In
another similar incident, North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD) scrambled to deploy a pair of CF-18
fighter jets to intercept a drone which would have interfered
with a commercial flight headed to Ottawa, Canada [21].
The implementation of a novel technical intervention such as
the aforementioned drone de-authentication technique would
quickly, easily, and efficiently allow commercial planes to
disengage a drones flight path thus protecting passenger
safety. This is critical before the next near miss becomes
an true incident.
B. Integrity Attack
To compromise data integrity of the drone, the following
steps were carried out:
• The Kali Linux machine was connected to the drones
network, then the command iwconfig was used to
display the wireless interface connected to the drone
network, which in this case was wlan0.
• Next, the command ifconfig wlan0 was used to display
the IP address of the drone, which was 192.168.42.86.
Once the IP address was determined, the command
nmap sn 192.168.42.1 -254 was used to scan the
network to list all used IP addresses and the de-
fault getaway in the range from 192.168.42.1 to
192.168.42.254. The result shows that the default get-
away was 192.168.42.1.
• The command nmap 192.168.42.1 was run to scan the
Parrot Bebop 2 for open ports. FTP port was open, a
port that can be used to access the internal storage of
the drone, which is the port we used to perform the
upcoming attack.
• An FTP session was initiated to 192.168.42.1 to gain
access to the Parrot Bebop 2s internal storage. It appears
that once the connection was initiated, root shell priv-
ilege was gained. Files and directories in the internal
storage were accessible, which confirms the second
hypothesis because videos and photos taken by the
drone. Figure 2. demonstrate successful download of
content of internal storage media.
Fig. 2. Downloading video to the attackers controller
• Additionally, the command mput was used to upload the
file hacked.jpg to the drones internal storage as shown
in Figure 3.
• The root privileges gained by the initiated FTP session
enables the deletion of files from the Parrott Bebop 2
using the command delete as shown in Figure 4
• Moreover, the root privilege enables renaming the files
of the the Parrott Bebop 2 as shown in Figure 5, which
confirms the third hypothesis that the files in the Parrot
Bebop 2 can be easily accessed and manipulated.
Fig. 3. Uploading photo to the drone
Fig. 4. Deleting a file from the drone through FTP
Fig. 5. Renaming a file of the drone through FTP
C. Data Acquisition
There are several methods of data acquisition for iPhone
forensics. Such methods include using commercial tools such
as oxygen, XRY, and using the dd command in Linux as
illustrated by Zdziarski [15]. Figure 6 presents an ideal
acquisition and process structure that begins with confis-
cation through data acquisition and follows through to the
forensic analysis that should be followed for small-scale
device forensics.
Figure 6 proposes an ideal framework for forensic analysis
of small-scale drone. It begins by determining the status of
the drone; this can vary between running state, crashed state,
Fig. 6. Proposed simple forensic processing framework for small-scale
drones
or operational state. If the drone is crashed within a crime
scene, then law enforcement can proceed by confiscating the
device. If the device is mid-air then law enforcement can use
this proposed approach to de-authenticate the drone, take
control of it, and confiscate it. Under both circumstances,
the proper legal forensic best practices of seizure should
be followed. This is to say that law enforcers have the
correct authorization or required warrants to conduct the
confiscation. Once confiscated, law enforcement can proceed
with analysis of the drone. In processing the device, basic
steps such as preparation, identification, collection, and cus-
tomization must be adhered to. This is done by accessing the
risk to investigation, identifying obvious physical evidence
on the drone (which may lead to the owner), identifying
system capability of the drone and identifying technical
requirements and tools needed to conduct forensics analysis.
During the forensic analysis phase, with the set of forensic
tools identified for investigation, it is necessary to analyze the
WIFI connection information between drone and controller,
the geo-location data from the drone, the storage, the camera
and all other areas within the drone where data is processed.
The documentation must be completed, a report compiled,
and findings presented during the final phase. In our research,
we followed our proposed simple approach for forensic
processing framework for small-scale drones. Firstly, the data
was acquired from the iPhone 6S used to control the drone
via iTunes backup [16]. The backup is stored in the AppData
file located on the C: drive as shown in Figure 7.
The .plist files, i.e. property list files, contain various kinds
of information such as basic device information, applications
used on the iPhone and configurations [17]. In order to ensure
the integrity of the evidence, the SHA-1 value was calculated
and compared with the latter-calculated hash value after the
analysis was completed as shown in Figure 8 below
Fig. 7. iPhone backup via iTunes
Fig. 8. 1 hash value
In order to recover the images and videos from the drone,
a Kali Linux machine was connected to the drone through
FTP. The main file containing the data is called internal 000.
It contains 6 main directories, some of which contain files
and subdirectories. The following diagram(Figure 9) shows
the hierarchy of the directory internal 000.
Fig. 9. Hierarchy of internal file
This depicts a clear delineation that no security measure is
in place to provide secure authentication or to protect stored
data integrity. This is a good indication that an adversary can
easily manipulate data for malicious purposes or used this
technique as an anti-forensic measure - further complicating
the forensic investigators work.
D. Forensic Analysis
In analyzing the Controller, in this case the iPhone 6S,
since the majority of the data in the backup is encrypted, the
attempt of using SQLite viewer software was not successful.
Therefore, the files were examined individually to identify
the information that can be potentially critical to an investiga-
tion. The basic information about the iPhone 6S device such
as the device name, GUID, IMEI, installed applications and
serial number was found in the info.plist file. By analyzing
the files, traces of the identity of the drone owner were found.
The Apple ID used to download the application that was used
to control the drone was found. In addition, more information
about the Apple ID and region was found as shown in Figure
10.
Fig. 10. Apple ID and region extracted from the log files
Furthermore, the first name and last name associated with
the Apple ID was identified as shown in Figure 11. This
helps in identifying the drone operator’s identity
Fig. 11. First and last name associated with the Apple ID
In addition to associating the region with the Apple ID
account and identity of the account owner, correlating the
drone with the iPhone was possible. There were several files
in the backup data that list the flight dates and times with the
serial numbers of the drones that used for the flights. Figure
12 shows an example of a flight on 07/02/2017, where the
time was 4:26:19 PM, GMT +4 (i.e. the UAE time zone).
This confirms the fourth hypothesis; the ownership of the
drone can be established with information found on drones
media storage.
Fig. 12. Linking the drone to the flights
Since commercial tools for extracting data from the iPhone
was not used, finding the deleted videos and images was
not possible via iTunes backup. However, the record of the
number of flights and the total flight time was found as shown
in Figure 13. This can help investigators in determining
the number of videos expected to be found in the drone
and queue them to look for logs to find GPS coordinates
and other information of deleted flights which may also be
relevant to an investigation
Through further analysis, it was also possible to find the
GPS coordinates of the flights taken. Figure 14 shows basic
Fig. 13. Information about drone flights
information about the flight and the drone such as: the serial
number, UUID, and drone controller, date and time of the
flight, and location information. Such information can be
crucial to forensic investigators in order to correlate a suspect
using the drone with a specific time and location.
Fig. 14. Basic information about the flight
During the experiment, the drone was flown from four
different locations: three within Abu Dhabi City and one
within Alain City. Upon further analysis, all four locations
from where the drone took off were identified. Figure 15
shows the takeoff location in Al Ain, while Figure 15 shows
one of the locations in Abu Dhabi. The files that contained
this information also contained the date of the flight, which
makes correlating such information even easier. The above
scenarios can be used to prove the fifth hypothesis; the ability
to correlate and reconstruct events.
Fig. 15. Take off location in Al Ain City
Fig. 16. One of the take off locations in Abu Dhabi City
From the acquired backup files, the image inserted in
the attack and the renamed file were found in the internal
000 file. This shows how easy it can be for attackers to
manipulate potential evidence as shown in Figure 17.
Fig. 17. Renamed and inserted files
Since the drone was hacked using a de-authentication
attack, traces of the attack were found in the log files.
Disassociation packets were sent to the controller (MAC
address 68:db:ca:bc:ee:8f) as shown in Figure 18 below;
this proves the sixth hypothesis that artifacts from previous
attacks can be acquired.
Fig. 18. De-authentication attack
E. Drone Context Data Model
There are various ways we can model context data for
drones to understand drone data. The drone context data
model will help forensic investigators clearly understand the
types of data available and how best to proceed with the
investigation. To understand drone context data, we need
to adopt existing data models, and propose a data models
which will best fit drone data. The context data models in
consideration for drone data:
• The Key Value Model This is a simple data model
where information is represented using tuples. In this
case key value pairs can be used to describe the ca-
pability of a services provided by the drones. Service
discovery of the drone can be applied by using matching
algorithms.
• The Markup Scheme Model - This model can also
be considered for drones, but is not ideal because the
model comprises of having a hierarchical data structure
made up of mark-up tags, which includes attributes and
contents. The contents of the tags are usually recursively
defined by other tags [23].
• The Logic Based Model - This model can be considered
as theoretically desirable approach to model context
data for drones, but complexity in its implementation
can be an impediment. Facts expressions and rules are
generally used to define a context data model. Logic
based system are then used to modified (update, delete,
add) new fact. To gather ongoing new facts about the
context, reasoning is used to deduct new facts based on
existing rules [23].
• The Object Oriented Model - This model is a more
appropriate model to analyze context data model for
a drones as compared against Key Value, Mark up
Scheme or Logic Based. In this situation, objects are
used to represent different context types that encapsulate
processing and representation. Context data is accessed
using well-defined set of interfaces.
• The Ontology Based Model - This data model will be
the best to model drone context data. Although most
of the discuss data modeling approach can be used,
Ontology Based Model is the best for modeling drone
context data when evaluated against key criteria such
as simplicity, flexibility, genericity and expressiveness.
This is because an ontology based model represents
a description of concepts and relationships. It is a
formal specification between terms and relations. Data
is extracted through applying ontology-reasoning tech-
niques. As discussed by Bimal Aklesh Kumar [23] the
following will be appropriate description of comparative
data model as illustrated in Table 1. To illustrate that
Ontology Based Model will be the ideal model to use
for drone data, we can analyze drone data based on
the information provided the comparative data models.
As per Table 1, the following key criteria should be
considered: Simplicity, which stipulates that expressions
used should be simple and easily understood. Flexibil-
ity adjudicates that data model should easily support
the inclusion of new context entity and relationship.
Genericity accepts that the data model should not be
limited in supporting only certain context information
rather various types of context information should be
supported. Finally, Expressiveness looks at allowing as
much as it can be allowed, a detail description of context
[23].
Table 1 provides us a building block in analyzing and
selecting the best context data model for drones. The Key
Value Model will successfully pass for Simplicity, Generality
but will have challenges dealing Flexibility from recreating
new models from existing data. It also lacks ability to
express capability to support complex algorithms, which is
essential drone context data as we expect contest information
will consistently change as a drone flies around. Therefore,
ideally it will be cautious in case not to model drone context
data after it.
The Markup Scheme Model easily passes Simplicity as it
uses XML implementation. It passes Flexibility as it supports
Resource Description Framework (RDF). RDF comes in
handy for drones context data modeling. Unfortunately, the
model does not fully pass Genericity or Expressiveness. The
Markup Scheme Model has limitation on the type of context
data it can support and when query large set of data can
be problematic on performance. An impact on performance
can be disastrous in drones where the ability to maintain
consistence performance is essential to the operation of the
drone itself.
The Logic Based Model fails for simplicity. It is quite
challenging to implement as it is based. It fails for Flexibility
also as it is hard to build new logic from existing one.
Finally has high level of formality but suffers from lack
of Expressiveness and supporting the quality of contextual
information [23]. Any unavailable or missing contextual data
will be is difficult to address. Further deduction shows that
this model is error prone in it its applicability to an exist-
ing mobile computing environment. It is very challenging
because full logic reasoners are usually not available [23].
but the Object Oriented Model passes for Flexibility, Gener-
icity and Expressiveness but fails in Simplicity due to the
complexity of managing context data as object. This model
provides encapsulation to the details of context processing
and representation. At times, it becomes a tedious task to
query and obtain the desired result [23].
The Ontological approach to context data easily passes
all the criteria. For simplicity, it is very simple to create
and maintain context data using ontologies. It also allow
reused of data which will be essential to drone context model
as it provide the high degree of Flexibility. Further new
ontologies can be easily created among existing ontology
there by satisfying Genericity by supporting various types
of context information. Finally yet importantly, it easily
supports reasoning providing a good impetus support as
much as possible a detail description of context information
by the drone. The key rationale to model drone that with On-
tologies is that Ontologies offer flexibility and extensibility
and are naturally suited to distributed systems, as they may be
stored at different places and created by different authors. In
context modeling, ontologies can be used to describe drones
environment, activity, owners information, and services.
Overall using ontology methodology to model drone con-
text data, allows us to easily see which context information
is easily susceptible to an attack and how such information
can be encapsulated to protect and prevent such an attack.
In addition, authorities can use this information during a
forensic investigation to trace the drone back to the owner
in a case where the drone has been found to be involved
in an illegal activities. There are particular drone context
information, such as drone owners information, that may
not be available in all geographical areas, but since our
experiment was conducted in the United Arab Emirates
where it is required by law to register all drones, such
information is available.
Fig. 19. Ontology based context data model for drones
We have develop Figure 19 to depict an ontology of
a drone as a model for context data, which presents the
following information:
• Drone Information basic identifiers about drone (Mac
Address, model, type, year, services)
• Drone Owner Information information about users pro-
file (User Type, Name, Age, date of purchase, Address,
license number, Preferences)
• Services describes the types of services drone provide
required by the user (Hobby drone, Imaging, Data
Collection, surveillance, etc.).
• Activity describes the type of information required
by the drone (Flight Take off information, In flight
information, landing information).
• Environment describes the environment related proper-
ties (time, location etc.)
V. CONCLUSION
With the recent overwhelming increase use of drones, the
need for drone forensic analysis has become a necessity.
Sparse research has been conducted in the field of drone
forensic analysis and much more work is required in order to
create tools that will aid with law enforcement and for use in
cases of public safety. This paper briefly discusses different
research papers that have been published in the area of drone
forensic analysis. An experiment of two different types of
popular attacks against the Parrot Bebop 2 has been con-
ducted in order to determine the ability to collect evidentiary
information about these attacks. Firstly, the de-authentication
attack has been conducted by hijacking the communication
between the drone and its controller using Linux command
and IP address of the drone and its controller. This type of
attack could be a useful tool to help law enforcers in dealing
with drone acquisition and confiscation in situations where
drones are involved in a crime and before further forensic
analysis can be conducted. Secondly, the integrity attack has
been conducted through establishing a wireless connection
via FTP in order to modify the existing information and
fabricate new information. This type of attack could be used
maliciously and could easily complicate or mislead a forensic
investigator.
Acquisition of evidential information related to the attack
against the Parrot Bebop 2 has been done using FTP and
iTunes backup. Therefore, the analysis of the acquired data
showed that the Parrot Bebop 2 is vulnerable to attacks.
Moreover, it was proven that it is possible to link the drone
controller with the drone to prove ownership, and determine
the flight origin and other flight information to correlate and
reconstruct events. The proposed a small-scale drone ontol-
ogy for modeling drone context data, and simple forensic
processing framework will allow investigator to understand
drone context data and follow a simple framework during
investigation. In the future, the development of forensic
tools using this knowledge could easily be used to acquire
and analyze data from both the drone and its controller in
conjunction with other investigative techniques.
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